A proposed SEC rule would be a setback after 10 years
of progress toward bank regulatory modernization.
Unless the SEC changes course, traditional bank trust and custody activities
are in jeopardy.
For just about a decade, bankers, regulators and Congress have worked
together to modernize this country's regulatory framework with three clear
goals in mind: allow banks to diversify their product and service offerings;
enhance bank safety and soundness; and eliminate regulation that does
not serve a demonstrable purpose from either a safety and soundness or
a consumer protection point of view.
By adhering to these three goals, we have built a banking system that
is dramatically safer and more robust than it was in the previous quarter-century,
and a system that is providing consumers with better products in ever
more convenient ways.
However, the gains of the last decade will be undermined if regulators
place additional regulatory burdens on the financial services sector that
provide no clear, demonstrable benefit to the safety and soundness of
the sector or to consumers.
One example of this kind of misguided regulation is found in a recently
proposed rule from the SEC. This rule would restrict some traditional
activities in which banks are presently allowed to engage directly (RIN
3232-A119, 66 Fed. Reg. 27760, May 18, 2001). This proposal would harm
all banks, but it would be particularly corrosive for community banks,
a sector we should try to promote as a matter of policy.
The SEC is proposing, among other things, to do the following:
Generally require banks that engage in traditional securities-related
trust activities to either register as broker/dealers (which is a practical
impossibility) or "push out" their securities-related activities
to a separate registered broker-dealer.
Create a line between traditional trust activities and full-brokerage
activities based on a "chiefly compensated" test that is flawed
in three respects:
(1) It is enormously complex and expensive for the banks and the agency
to administer.
(2) It is extremely disruptive, because it would require account-by-account
calculations, rather than an overall "line of business" analysis.
(3) It is biased in favor of determining that activities should be conducted
by an SEC-registered broker-dealer entity.
All of these things would cause bankers to throw up their hands and push
these traditional activities out of the bank, rather than incur the headaches
and expense of complying with the new rules.
Upset bank custody operations by restricting customary fees for order-taking.
Impose additional and disruptive restrictions on referral fees paid to
bank employees.
Require banks to be registered as dealers in asset securitizations, unless
they meet an unreasonably high bar in terms of whether the securitization
pools are "predominantly" originated by banks.
It is hard to believe, but in fact there would be essentially no benefit
to all these time-consuming and expensive new rules. The rules would merely
impose added costs that will ultimately be borne by the consumer, and
burdens that will diminish the time and resources available to banks to
deal with real safety and soundness issues.
Trust department and other securities-related activities conducted by
banks have not caused any material safety and soundness problems, nor
have they resulted in significant consumer complaints. On the contrary,
the record of banks in this area is remarkably strong.
The SEC proposal is an overly aggressive interpretation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, which is designed to broaden the menu of activities a bank can offer
and to decrease their regulatory burden. The act eliminated the broad
bank exemption from the securities laws, but at the same time, it added
clear, activity-specific exemptions that are designed to ensure that banks
can continue doing what they have always done in the bank under the previous
broad exemption.
The SEC proposal is intended to keep banks from conducting a full-service
broker-dealer business in the bank. In reality, the effect of the SEC
proposal would be to undo the Gramm-Leach-Bliley exemptions for traditional
bank activities by making it so costly and complicated for banks to continue
these activities in the bank that they would be forced to push them out
into a separate broker-dealer.
Some banks, bank trade associations, and bank regulators have spoken out
against this proposal. This is not enough. All bankers should speak out
strongly about this proposal.
The SEC is run by some of the most sophisticated and able public servants
in government. Therefore, there is good reason to hope that once the problems
with the current proposal are fully aired, the agency will develop a more
workable solution.